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Is Overbuilding Risk Declining? Evidence 
From Hotel Markets
John B. Corgel1
“In the old days, construction statistics and other important data were closely guarded 
secrets. Developers can now look at competitors’ numbers and tell at a glance if an area is 
becoming overbuilt.” From a Wall StreetJournal article about U.S. office markets, January 23, 
2004.
I. Introduction
Commercial real estate markets have the tendency to become overbuilt as demonstrated in 
the U.S and other developed countries during the past three decades and analyzed in many 
conceptual and empirical real estate economics papers.2 Some types of real estate tend to 
become more overbuilt than others. Again, both theory and evidence support this conclu­
sion.
As a working definition, ‘overbuilding’ occurs when additions to supply, principally from 
new property construction, accumulate to a point at which the existing supply of space clearly 
exceeds the current demand for space. Well, so what? — demand for space eventually catches 
up! But unfortunately, before demand growth eliminates overbuilding conditions two 
policy issues surface. First, continuing to direct capital to construction of buildings that no 
one needs is an obvious misallocation of society’s resources. Second, overbuilding imposes 
financial pressures on existing property owners who may then default on mortgage loans. 
Overbuilding, therefore, elevates the level of stress in the real estate capital markets that may 
not subside until well after demand and supply reach a balance.
At certain points over the past three decades, hotels became the most overbuilt among 
property types, making U.S. hotel markets an excellent candidate for studies of possible 
future overbuilding problems.3 As shown in Exhibit I (on the following page), comple­
tions rose sharply as real rent (i.e., real ADR) declined twice during the past three decades — 
the early I970s and the late I980s. The paths of real rents and completions appear more 
coincidental throughout much of the I990s. With hotel markets recovering from a four- 
punch flurry of recession, catastrophic events, war, and human disease, consideration must 
be given to the question: are hotel investors again exposed to excessive supply growth risk? 
Fortunately, the answer appears to be no! Strong doses of rational federal policy and care 
giving combined with an information explosion create an environment going forward for 
modest hotel market overbuilding, at worst. The same conclusion may apply to other 
overbuilding-prone property types, such as office real estate.
1John B. Corgel is a Professor at the School o f Hotel Administration and the Program in Real
Estate, Cornell University.
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This paper reviews the causes of overbuilding and reports on findings from an empirical 
study of hotel market demand and supply relationships during the most recent lS-year 
period. The findings support the conclusion that overbuilding risk is declining.
II. Mild Cases and Severe Cases of Overbuilding
Most stories about excessive real estate supply growth begin with the recognition that 
markets follow cyclical patterns over time. Historically, commercial real estate supply cycles 
have fallen into two categories according to property type. For some types such as multifam­
ily, industrial, and small retail, the pattern of completions directly followed the business cycle 
during the past few decades (Mills, 1995 and Wheaton, 1999). Aggregate demand shocks 
preceded increases in construction activity with a normal response pattern suggesting that 
real estate cycles for these property types are exogenous. The supply additions of office space 
(Wheaton 1987), regional retail center space (Benjamin, Jud, and Winkler 1998), and hotel 
rooms (Wheaton and Rossoff, 1998), however, exhibited less conforming patterns relative 
to those of the general economy. Supply in these cases appears to have a ‘mind of its own’ 
and is sometimes referred to as following endogenous cycles.
Investment in office, regional shopping centers, and hotels may expose investors to excess 
overbuilding risk. Yet, fears about overbuilding mainly arise from their experiences during 
two historical periods; (1) the middle and late-1970s and (2) the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
The real estate markets operated during the former period in an economic environment 
characterized by both double-digit inflation and unemployment. The steep drop in nomi­
nal interest rates coming out of this period has been directly linked to office overbuilding by 
Kling and McCue (1987). The U.S. real estate markets during the second of the two periods 
performed under the influence of over-stimulative tax law and financial institution deregu­
lation. Corcorcan (1987) and Hendershott and Kane (1992) document the perverse effects 
of this early-1980s legislation on the commercial real estate markets.
Furthermore, as the quote from the Wall Street Journal at the beginning of this paper 
suggests, many believe that the substantially lower cost of real estate market information
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today- compared to earlier decades when overbuilding occurred- lessens the probability of 
overbuilding going forward. For the above reasons, it seems unlikely that severe overbuild­
ing will occur following the post- 2001 recovery, and also unlikely that supply growth in any 
property type will occur irrespective of movements in the economy.
III. Assessing Overbuilding Risks
The real estate cycle imposes credit risk management costs on lenders and regulators (Chinloy 
1996). In an effort to control these costs, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
(2003) recently began monitoring the level of Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) construc­
tion activity relative to existing stocks and to current vacancy in remembrance of the real 
estate crisis of the 1980s and in recognition of the risks that overbuilding imposes on 
federally chartered intuitions. Institutions located in MSAs that the FDIC deems as over­
building candidates would come under closer scrutiny in their commercial mortgage lending 
activities. The FDIC document states that, “The ranking schemes presented are intended to 
serve as a basis for prioritizing more in-depth analysis of depository institution risk expo­
sures to individual markets and to specific market segments (p.1).” Credit rationing might 
even occur in the MSAs and property segments for which the FDIC determines that supply 
is being added at too rapid a rate.
Notwithstanding the substantial costs of overbuilding during the past three decades, over­
building risk may be somewhat overstated if the effects of excessive supply growth in the 
space market are not translated directly into the asset market. Mueller (199S) argues that real 
estate cycles have two forms: (1) a physical cycle that reflects demand, supply, occupancy, and 
rent, and (2) a financial cycle that relates to the financial flow of capital into new and existing 
assets. This separation is developed to explain the lag in asset prices from changes in occu­
pancy and rents. Hence, overbuilding may produce debt coverage problems as its effects are 
felt in the space market, but default probabilities and loan loss severity may not substantially 
increase if the effects on asset prices are felt with a long lag. The experiences of the recent 
recession and catastrophic events provide a parallel example. Rents and room rates dropped 
quickly and dramatically in many local markets, yet property prices remained surprisingly 
firm.4 Just as the decline in demand adversely impacted the space market without translation 
to the asset market, a surge in construction could produce the same series of outcomes. 
Sivitanides, Torto, and Wheaton (2003) attribute property price firmness in the face of 
declining fundamentals to a simultaneous decline in interest rates. Similarly, an upward 
movement of interest rates would stymie overbuilding.5
IV. Why Do Real Estate Markets Become 
Overbuilt?
A fairly long list of reasons to explain real estate market cycles and overbuilding have 
accumulated in print over the past two decades. This list follows:
I. Dong Delivery Dags — It takes considerable time to plan and construct operating 
properties, and thus supply adjusts quite slowly to demand changes (McDonald
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2002). Property types with longer delivery lags are the most prone to overbuilding 
(Torto and Wheaton 2002).
2. Mistakes Due to Myopic Expectations — Given the short-run supply inelasticity of 
real estate, immediate increases in rents and occupancy may be interpreted as long- 
run changes, thus triggering development. With myopic expectations, these 
future rents are capitalized at a constant rate into prices (Wheaton 1999).
3. Mistakes Because o f  Unpredictable Demand Growth and Volatility — Rapid demand 
growth and volatility create difficult forecasting environments that result in 
mistakes, especially given that exercise of the development option is difficult 
to reverse (Grenadier 1995a, Torto and Wheaton 2002, and FDIC 2003).
4. Mistakes Caused by Prisoner’s Dilemma — Kummerow (1999) argues that market 
failure in the form of overbuilding occurs because developers involved in the 
early phases of concurrent projects cannot determine which competing projects 
wih come to completion.
5. Demand and Supply Elasticity Differences — Overbuilding occurs when long-run sup­
ply price elasticity greatly exceeds the price elasticity of demand (Wheaton 1999).
6. Federal Legislative Actions — Two well-known federal acts in the early 1980s created 
subsequent development frenzy (Corcorcan 1987 and Hendershott and Kane 1992).
7. Interest Rate Volatility — Rapid downward movements in interest rates over­
stimulate development (Kling and McCue 1987).
8. Lease Contract Eviction — Persistence patterns in rents and occupancy occur be­
cause of certain landlord behaviors in leased properties, thus creating sub- 
optimal development option exercise (Grenadier 1995b).
9. High Cost o f  Holding Land — Wang and Zhou (2000) show that developers will 
oversupply the market at the first sign of opportunity because of the high 
cost of holding land.
10. Economic Base Structure — As basic employment slows, non-basic employment 
continues to grow giving false signals to developers about opportunities 
(McNulty 1995 and Gallagher and Wood 1999).
11. High Rate o f  Economic Obsolescence — Property types with high rates of obso­
lescence experience relatively high frequency cyclical patterns because of persis­
tent replacement demand (Wheaton 1999). This characteristic raises the prob­
ability of overbuilding.
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V. Why Do Hotel Markets Experience Severe 
Overbuilding?
In the Wang and Zhou (2000) model, overbuilding occurs as a rational response to develop­
ment option exercise given that land does not produce periodic income. Because land cost 
has a central role in the model, the ratio of land-to-building cost becomes a condition that 
explains why some property types are more inclined to become overbuilt than others. They 
conclude that office and hotel markets are the most likely to experience development booms 
not supported by the local economics due to relatively high cost of holding land in inventory 
for these uses. Yet, these results may be specific to periods when external events cause the 
relative costs of land and building to deviate from historical norms. For example, property 
types with historically high capital-to-land ratios became the most favored development 
targets of real estate syndicates during the 1980s as they sought to maximize depreciation 
allowances.
During the past ten years, real estate markets operated without significant external influ­
ences. Also, information costs declined sharply in recent years due to far superior market 
data. For example, Smith Travel Research currently supplies RevPAR data for 4 million 
rooms in the U.S. (about 7S percent of all U.S. hotel rooms) each month and about 1 million 
each day. The monthly time series begins in 1987.
In light of these changes, important issues related to real estate cycles must be reconsidered. 
Evidence presented later in this paper suggests that the hotel cycle has become less endog­
enous during the past decade. Hence, the risks associated with capital allocation to hotel 
investment should be in decline. Severe overshooting on the supply side of sensitive real 
estate markets, such as hotels, may happen in the future only after periods of extraordinary 
demand growth.
VI. Analysis of Hotel Market data through the 
Most Recent Cycle
An endogenous supply cycle produces excess construction of operating properties without 
corresponding demand stimuli. As an initial step in the accumulation of evidence about the 
existence of an endogenous hotel market cycle during the past 1S years, the quarterly hotel 
market data are examined for overbuilding and associated demand triggers. Following 
Gallagher and Wood (1999), a simple filter is introduced to identify quarters exhibiting 
excess supply and excess demand conditions, where excess is defined as
E > = g  + a  (1)
The value of E equals one when the year-over-year growth rate during a quarter exceeds the 
long-run average growth rate, g, plus one standard deviation, a . Successive quarters of 
excess supply not preceded by quarters of excess demand offers prima fascia evidence of an 
endogenous cycle.
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Exhibit 2 presents the results from applying the rule in Equation (1). The data come from 
Smith Travel Research and include all chain-affiliated properties in the 7 5 large hotel markets 
in the U.S. Excess supply conditions occurred in two distinct sub-periods since 1988 - the 
late 1980s and the late 1990s. Demand growth was strong during or immediately following 
both sub-periods of excessive supply growth. Two potential development triggers, ADR 
and real personal income also exhibited abnormal growth patterns immediately prior to and 
continuing through the quarter when supply surged. This evidence suggests that abnormal 
supply growth in the U.S. hotel market occurred in response to extremely positive signals 
from the demand side of the market. Hotel developers appeared to have responded early 
and rationally to fundamental signals.
Exhibit 2: Excess Demand and Supply Using Plus a Filter
Periods Excess
Supply
Excess
ADR
Excess
Demand
Excess
Personal
Income
Sub-Period 1 (Late 1980s) 1988 I-IV 1988 I-IV 
1989 II
1988 I, III
Sub-Period 2 (Late 1990s) 1998 I-IV
1999 I-III
1995IV 
1996 II-IV 
1997 I-II
2000 II 1995 I 
1997IV 
1998 I-IV 
2000 II
Source: Smith Travel Research
VII. Elasticity Estimates
The response of demand and supply to changing rents and asset prices provides useful 
information about the mechanics of real estate markets. In simulations performed by 
Wheaton (1999), the size of the spread between the elasticity of demand with respect to rent 
and elasticity of supply with respect to asset price has a strong influence on how much 
‘overshooting’ occurs on the supply side. Estimating this relative elasticity, therefore, be­
comes an empirical question and comparing the relative elasticity during different historical 
cycles indicates whether risk is changing.
U sing hotel market data for 1969 I through 1994 IV, Wheaton and Rossoff (1998) estimate 
the demand elasticity as -0.48 and the supply elasticity as 2.20 making the absolute value of 
the spread equal to 1.72. I estimate a spread of 1.10 from a demand elasticity of -0.48 and a 
supply elasticity of 1.53. By eliminating data from the late 1980s and early 1990s, the spread 
narrows even more. The demand elasticity in the hotel markets has remained stable since the 
late 1960s, while the supply elasticity is becoming smaller. Smaller supply elasticity means 
that construction and other alterations to supply happen at a reduced level as rents and asset 
prices change. More modest responses on the supply side provide hope that causes of real 
estate market overbuilding are becoming less pronounced.
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Conclusion
The real estate cycle exposes equity investors and lenders to financial risk. The true costs 
of these risks are not known and little evidence exists regarding the pricing of these 
risks. An endogenous cycle imposes additional risk on capital providers. Real estate 
market models indicate that office properties, hotels, and large retail centers have the 
greatest overbuilding risk. The evidence for these claims, however, comes from periods 
during which the external influences on real estate markets were extraordinary. During 
the past ten years, real estate markets operated without significant external influences. 
Also, information costs declined sharply in recent years due to far superior market data.
In light of these changes, important issues related to real estate cycles must be reconsid­
ered. Evidence presented in this paper suggests that the hotel cycle has become less 
endogenous during the past decade. Hence, the risks associated with capital allocation to 
hotel investment may be declining. Other indicators imply that severe overshooting and 
other irrationalities on the supply side of sensitive real estate markets, such as hotels, 
may happen in the future only after periods of extraordinary demand growth.
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Endnotes
2 See Pyhrr, Born, Manning, and Roulac (2003) for a review.
3 A known susceptibility to overbuilding creates another reason not to invest in hotel 
real estate. Institutional investors and lenders already have at least two good reasons 
to pass on hotel opportunities — the absence of credit security provided by leases and 
the management intensity that comes with operating businesses.
4 See Corcorcan and Iwai (2003) and Sivitanides, Torto, and Wheaton (2003) for 
different points of view on the causes of these unique market conditions.
5 This outcome would be the reverse of what Kling and McCue (1987) found as 
interest rates declined in the 1970s.
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